WHEN YOU DECLARE VICTORY, PLEASE ASK THE OTHER SIDE FIRST

A short note on conventional deterrence

Deterrence is thus viewed as a function of existing weaponry. …Such an explanation is flawed. - Mearsheimer

Ever since the AUKUS deal, I have been hearing a great deal about the deterrence effect of this acquisition. As I had only read about nuclear deterrence and was never taught about conventional deterrence during my military career, I thought it would be beneficial to do some light reading. Given that an ASPI pundit has recently claimed that putting a few holes in an Iranian mountain somehow has re-energised deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, this is a bold claim. It became somewhat of a more compelling urge.

The key difference between nuclear and conventional, as stated by James Wirtz (and its Achilles Heel), is contestability. Unlike nuclear deterrence (Schelling’s ‘Diplomacy of Violence’ as he describes an atomic exchange), the guarantee of massive destruction is in doubt. Wirtz additionally raises another point: What type of strategic deterrence do you wish to conduct? He lists three: retaliation, punishment and denial. None of them is likely to have an immediate and quick resolution. He offers sage advice: conventional capability does not equate to credibility. In the nuclear case, this is already granted. Therefore, claims of conventional deterrence without asking the other side are somewhat contentious.

In a comprehensive literature review of conventional deterrence, Dali’Agnol and Durate posit that denial may be where conventional deterrence can yield its best return for less than major powers. However, nations seeking to do so should not chase the exquisite platforms of such major powers; instead, they should raise the costs unique to their strategic situation.

Mearsheimer’s rather excellent study on this understudied topic concludes in a rather breathtaking manner. Military considerations alone did not serve as a deterrent in his case studies. It is primarily a political decision based on the costs of military action. Yes, the efficacy of the demanded military strategy could be reviewed, but in the case of, say, the Nazi (and Soviet) invasion of Poland, Hitler did not care that the German military was under-prepared. The same could be said of the Israeli Six-Day War of 1967. However, in both cases, they did not result in a cessation of hostilities. It is important to note that when a severe imbalance of forces existed, the political risks were considered acceptable, and the military considerations themselves were not a deterrent. However, where the strength of forces (a difficult concept to quantify) was balanced (credible), a form of deterrence at the political level can occur.

Mueller somewhat echoes Mearsheimer, Dali’Agnol and Durate, and goes so far as to list a set of principles.

· Plan against specific threats.

· Design forces to deter (not just the type of equipment, but location, etc).

· Expect misperception and minimise it.

· Ensure heavy enemy losses on first contact.

· Make credible threats.

· Make optimism about aggression impossible.

Suppose you are familiar with the last forty years of Australian strategic dialogue. In that case, I struggle to see how such a clear set of strategic principles could ever have been articulated in Australia.

In an excellent study of Israeli conventional deterrence over three decades, Shimshoni concurs with many of the observations of the above authors but takes a far deeper dive into the societal and geo-strategic factors. The bottom line, as he concludes, is that it is not as simple as just lobbing high explosives over long distances or being able to sneak up on enemy carrier groups.

‘The importance of a relativistic definition of deterrence success is confirmed by the study of Israel's experience. The question: Was deterrence successful? Can only be answered by first answering the question. Deterrence of what and in what time frame? In all three cases, one can identify deterrence failure at a tactical level, concurrent with success at a strategic level, and at times vice versa. But Israeli deterrence exhibited an even more complex relativism: at times, success or failure at one level or in a given time frame directly influenced the fortunes of deterrence at other levels and periods. These characteristics of the dependent variable are not an encouraging finding in the search for parsimonious and predictive theory.’

This is somewhat a confirmation that conventional deterrence lies in the realm of politics and statesmanship, rather than access to a particular technology. The ambitious claims of any military planner or strategist that X capability will lead to Y strategic effects are not supported by peer-reviewed academic studies that I have read.

If a talking head stated, ‘We are procuring this to ensure a more effective denial of this or that to exploit a particular strategic advantage with no promise of outcome,’ I would be somewhat more satisfied (and surprised). In the current nuclear submarine example, the only explanation so far offered is ‘oh, it can sail a long way fast and quietly for a long time, with some missiles and torpedos.’ This doesn’t cut it as a strategic explanation, especially at the price. Please note I am not anti-AUKUS, but the problem is it hasn’t been explained enough to be pro either. As Prof Albert Palazzo has said about Tier One AUKUS, ‘it’s not enough to deter them, but it will certainly get their attention.’ One thing all the texts mention is that failed deterrence is bad.

Maybe I fell asleep in the Staff College lecture on conventional deterrence (not improbable), but what is fundamentally disturbing me is both current US dialogue (peace through strength, lethality, now being mindlessly parroted by the Shadow Minister for Defence in Australia {reminder I am politically agnostic, but seriously}), and Australia’s continued mentioned of capability-based deterrence. Unlike its nuclear father, capability is not a primary component of conventional deterrence. It matters, but higher strategic considerations are core.

There is a glimmer of hope, as Sam Roggeveen, Rory Medcalf, and Albert Palazzo have all offered conventional solution sets of varying types and methods. Those are fundamentally deterrent in their foundation. However, beyond people talking in comfortable chairs, I have yet to see tangible outcomes.

If a total strategic novice like me can find all this in a few hours, why aren’t the talking heads in the strategic debate doing some reading as well? These words are not hollow semantics; they are the seeds of strategy. They are not for sound bites; their misuse, as seen in my recent article on asymmetry, will cause profound damage in times of crisis. I would argue this is symptomatic of the general lack of depth and unquestioning acquiescence to the most senior speaker on the stage in the Australian strategic debate. However, in this case, the symptom could become the cause. We are becoming too addicted to believe we can deter, without asking or even considering the threat, credibility is very much in the eye of the beholder, not us.

Nevertheless, the difference between nuclear and conventional deterrence might indeed boil down to a single generalization: the target actually has a say when it comes to the execution of a conventional deterrent threat.. - James Wirtz