After the Flood

The need for a step change in Australian security thinking

After the Flood

Jason Thomas

Lord, here comes the flood,

We’ll say goodbye to flesh and blood,

If again the seas are silent in any still alive,

It’ll be those who gave their island to survive,

Drink up dreamer, you are running dry.

- Here Comes the Flood- Peter Gabriel

The past six months in world affairs, by anyone’s measure, have been turbulent beyond even the choking disruption of COVID and the Western paralysis on the second invasion of Ukraine. Many of the events had prominent indicators (Project 2025, pre-election rhetoric), aligned with a systemic decay in the functions of the US government that has arguably been occurring since the resignation of President Nixon. Unchecked by both parties. However, the execution has been violent and chaotic—a veritable flood of the malign and incompetent.

The world has seen a sudden end to Pax Americana, both in its imperfect reality and in concept. A strategic compression wave has passed. Allies are now facing a threat to their sovereignty from their major partner. China has easily withstood economic bullying. Israel, locally unshackled, however, Arab states are now able to purchase diplomatic renewal and the cessation of sanctions for partner nations. A paradox I never thought I would see. Certainly, one I would bank, PM Netanyahu didn’t either. The US sought conflict termination in Yemen, which enabled the belligerent to frame it as a victory and continue striking against Israel and non-US shipping. NATO is now starting to plan for a US exit.

This is not to mention the even more drastic internal changes, which will rapidly diminish the US to just being a major military power. That decline will take decades. The unthinkable is now only 12 months away; deferred or cancelled elections and detention without trial loom ominously. The global security trouble with this is, of course, when you only have a hammer, everything else looks like a nail. The Forever Wars era may not be quite over.

The response from many other nations, following the initial period of stasis after the drenching, has been far more encouraging. Centrist parties have performed well in elections in other democracies. Europe is finally running out of patience with Hungary, and has awoken, too late, but awoken, from its military torpor. It is, of course, wildly imperfect. Australia, as usual, is reenacting a scene from the TV series Blackadder, sticking a pair of underwear on their head and going ‘wibble.’ Election year aside, it is a singularly inept strategic performance.

Former national security sacred cows, such as the rules-based global order and the US military's role in securing global trade, have been found to be hollow. But perhaps this is a good thing—better reality than a persistent illusion.

Until recently, China has been following Napoleon’s advice to the Old Guard at the Battle of Jena, ‘Gentlemen, when the enemy has committed a mistake, we must not interrupt him too soon.’ However, the archipelagic games against the Philippines have intensified. This will be the first test of the anti-China rhetoric of this administration. Like the bullies of the Trump administration itself, a passive US response to China will only embolden them.

The vaulting incompetence of the US executive and vain self-interest will mean other storm surges. Different factors will amplify some. Mark O'Neill has highlighted that Australia’s moat, the sea-air gap, is further narrowed with the widespread proliferation of advanced missile systems. This, coupled with the tactical effects of drones, presents the most significant changes in a generation, at least in the military context. Whether AI will achieve a similar effect remains to be seen. It will indeed be in staff processes and targeting, but in terms of revolution, that remains to be seen.

More importantly, a shift away from the US financial system that commenced post the Global Financial Crisis will accelerate. Evidenced by the fact that no country has yielded to US tariff threats. It is interestingly indicative of a weakness in service-based economies in trying to generate that type of national power. A lesson the Trump administration ignores, noting his toadying oligarchs are also another key in degrading national power. The lowering of US credit ratings, risks to the US bond markets, and potentially skyrocketing debt with no revenue stream to serve it. Mark a tsunami greater than any I have discussed so far.

All the while, the existential threat of climate change is neglected. Those with far greater nuclear strategy expertise may additionally wish to add that concern. However, the restraining hand of China on Russia in the Ukraine War suggests a reluctance to unsheathe that sword. Nor has any of the Trump administration's rhetoric on China shown any indicators of such.

There is little point in listing a litany of recent disasters and looming apocalypse without discussing the ‘so what,’ at least for Australia.

Fortunately, we already have Australian writers thinking about such things in a far more measured, intelligent, and less polemical manner than I. To name a few, Rory Medcalf, Peter Layton, Mark O’Neill, and Elizabeth Buchanan. They are mercifully not writing job applications that masquerade as faux strategic assessments and are additionally devoid of the parochialism of their past service life. Such authors of the later camp contribute little; indeed, they are as destructive as the worst aspects of Australian strategic debate before the Australian mission in East Timor.

Medcalf’s push for a wider national dialogue on security, independence, and the greater use of bilateral treaties represents a fundamentally sound, overarching policy direction that starts to build strategic flexibility (I won’t use 'resilience,' because that is a somewhat reactive word). Layton consistently and now even more importantly highlights the importance of having and building an integrated security strategy.

O’Neill is likewise demanding a new integrated approach to deal with the new geography. Buchanan is even more forceful than Medcalf et al. Australia must develop its sense of self in strategic terms to define our purpose and place in the world. It is very difficult to achieve this conceptual grounding if you are shackled, right or wrong, to a major power alliance as your primary security mechanism. I have long said you can’t change if you don’t know yourself. The recent floods now make that change imperative.

The Australian pastime of shin-kicking specific points in the security system (e.g., the procurement process) doesn’t serve us well and is an example of the inability to define oneself. Security is a system primarily run by the government, but intra-, inter-, and supra-governmental requirements necessitate broad, rather than specific, scrutiny. A system produces the outcomes it is built to deliver; fix the system, not one or two gears. Too many strategic reviews state X and then claim we therefore need to buy Y; that is not a strategy but instead shopping.

This article is somewhat of a polemic, but I find it somewhat difficult to stay calm when the mantra is stay the course or worse, the Blackadder response. Another effect of the recent severity and high tempo of change is that, as academically verified, sound and ethical decision-making becomes very difficult. That is perhaps the deliberate choice of the initiators, but it doesn’t mean we have to be victims of it. As I have demonstrated in others, the solution sets are emerging. The usual suspects will not cut it. Best to prepare for the next deluge before it hits.

In conclusion, I will return to one of my long-time idols, Peter Gabriel, and the stanza at the start of this article. The island that is given away is not one of geography, but rather our insular views, which possess frightening immobility. We'd best drink from those trying to wake us up.